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"It was a . . . part of the said scheme and artifice to defraud that the
defendants ... did create, organize and operate a . . . movement known as
the 'I Am' movement and by means of false and fraudulent representations,
pretenses and promises hereinafter more particularly set forth, solicit, induce,
encourage, persuade and entice the persons to be defrauded to become mem-
bers and followers of the said 'I Am' movement." 1 To this indictment, the
defendants, the leaders of the movement, demurred, saying that the indict-
ment and prosecution sought "to attack the establishment of said religion or
religious beliefs, or to prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof, contrary
to the Constitution of the United States and the law of the land."12 The issue
thus was joined in United States v. Ballard,3 a case of conflict between re-
ligious expression and criminal law. The problems, issues and theories raised
by the two conflicting positions-the one regarding the movement as a scheme
to defraud; the other, as a religion protected from prosecution-will be the
starting point for this article's exploration of the meaning and implications
of a legal conception of privacy in the realm of religious expression. From
this basis we will seek to arrive at tools for adjudication and analysis in all
cases where religious rights are claimed by one of the parties.
The "I Am" movement embraced many doctrines. The Ballards professed
to be divine messengers. Some of the leaders claimed to have met Saint Ger-
main and Jesus Christ. In particular, they claimed to have attained a super-
natural state of "self-immortality" which enabled them to heal persons of in-
juries and diseases, including some that were classified by medicine as incur-
able. Members were told to abstain from meat and stimulants, and to study
books published and sold by the Ballards. 4 The Ballards kept their organiza-
tion functioning by using the mails: members wrote letters to each other, sent
and received records, books, magazines and contributions through the post
office. All the judges dealing with the litigation assumed that "I Am" was a
religion. We will not make that assumption, but instead will analyze the
tLegal Staff of U.S. Department of Labor. I owe an infinite debt of gratitude to
Professor Joseph Goldstein, who has been a continuing source of guidance and inspiration.
1. Indictment, Count 1(a), set forth in Record, vol. 1, pp. 4-5, United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) [hereinafter called Record].
2. Demurrer to Indictment, Paragraph II, Record; id. at 64.
3. 138 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), on remand, 152 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). Cf. 35 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
4. All these facts were asserted in the Indictment, Record, supra note 1, at 8-20;
see also id., vol. 2, pp. 814-21, vol. 3, pp. 123-65, 953-1178. At the trial, the meaning of
some of the claims was disputed. An appendix to Respondent's Brief in the Supreme
Court reproduces the text of a 1937 radio broadcast revealing some of the group's claims.
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definitional problem in such a way that we can determine precisely how and
when religion enters the case.
Federal law makes it criminal to obtain money through the mails by false
pretenses. 5 It was this statute which the Ballards were charged with violating.
The elements of the crime-the fraudulent scheme, an intent to defraud, and
a use of the mails 6-- seem to have been interpreted broadly. It has been held
that the fraudulent scheme must dominantly characterize some part of the
business.7 Although the victims need not have suffered pecuniary loss,8 fraud
must be predicated on more than disagreement of some with the accused. As
for intent, Learned Hand dealt with the matter as follows: "It was only
necessary in the case at bar that the defendants had no belief that they would
perform the promises held out to prospective members."9 He concluded that
the jury could reasonably infer intent from the nature of the promises and
the difficulty of fulfilling them. Finally, the statute is violated if the mail is in
fact used, even if the use be incidental and unpremeditated. 10 Only the third
element is indisputably present in Ballard.
Prior to Ballard, Crane v. United States 1 showed how easy it is to inter-
twine the two elements of misrepresentation and intent in a "religious" prose-
cution. The Crane court upheld a conviction of a man who advocated "mental
healing" and wrote tracts in which he said, "I am God." The issue tendered
was whether he had made his representations in "good faith."'12 Such a view-
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
6. Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928), stated the three necessary
elements. See West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933) (knowledge that rep-
resentations are false) ; United States v. Zalewskd, 29 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Kan. 1939)
(intent). Throughout the analysis of the Ballard case, it is assumed that there must be a
specific misrepresentation included in the fraudulent scheme. This assumption could be
questioned by reference to considerable authority such as Linden v. United States, 254
F.2d 500 (1958), which holds that a specific misstatement is not necessary. But it would
seem that a particular item of deceit is a necessary element of fraud, for otherwise there
is no falsity but merely, for example, betrayal of confidence. Whether betrayal of con-
fidence is a basis for fraud, absent a representation of trustworthiness, is ambiguous in
the cases. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1959). In any event, it would seem
hard to predicate fraud for religion as a whole under the Constitution, so we are driven
to find specific misrepresentations, and in this case the indictment alleges them. If a par-
ticular item of deceit is not a requisite element, some of the conceptual analysis would
lose its neatness but not its logic; the subsidiary attacks on fusing of the requisite elements
would lose some of their justice with respect to the deceitful defendant's position. See
infra note 17.
7. MeLendon v. United States, 2 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Graham v. United States,
102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939).
8. Wine v. United States, 260 Fed. 911 (8th Cir. 1919).
9. Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir.
1926). But see Norton v. United States, 92 F2d 753 (9th Cir. 1937).
10. Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1953).
11. 259 Fed. 480 (9th Cir. 1919). A similar result was reached in New v. United
States, 245 Fed. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), which upheld the conviction of Bishop New since
he was not "the immaculate personage he pretended to be." Id. at 721.
12. 259 Fed. at 482.
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point intertwines misrepresentation and intent because it makes a finding of
misrepresentation rest on an analysis of intent. We may suggest that this
fastening on "good faith" is a consequence of the absence, in this area of the
law, of common criteria for evaluating the truth or falsity of representations. 13
The government's theory in Ballard as to which particular representations
were false was not constant throughout the litigation, but the veracity of the
claims concerning healing and other powers (e.g., immortality and ascension),
the honesty of belief of the leaders in their representations and religion, and
the truth of the religion as a whole, were each questioned at various times.
The case suggests the following issues. (1) What is the domain of religion
and how do we proceed to define and apply it to legal problems? (2) What
comprises a fraudulent representation? (3) What comprises a religious ex-
pression? (4) What is religious expression in its different manifestations,
belief, ritual, action? How do we classify claims labeled as religion in domains
where other authorities traditionally hold sway? In Ballard, for example, cer-
tain claims conflict with medical theory. (5) Is there a distinction between
religious belief and action?
These five issues can be approached from two directions. First, Ballard
presents the problem of fraud in religious representation. An understanding
of the concepts "representation," "religion" or "fraud" may solve this -case.
The inquiry into representations and religion can focus on the first element of
the crime of mail fraud-what constituted a fraudulent scheme? Second, there
is the problem of at what point the first amendment enters discussion of a
situation which may affect freedom of religion, and what it commands. Our
inquiry will seek to understand how religion is related to representations, with
an eye to when the first amendment should be invoked. We will have to con-
front the problem of whether a representation can be religious, whether it can
be fraudulent, or whether it can be both. The gravamen of this search will be
the effect of the claim of religious characteristic on the application of the
mail fraud statute. In the search we will attempt to define for ourselves the
nature of religion for the purpose of the law and the first amendment and
try to decide its applicability as a defense to the application of this statute.
The Ballard defendants fought their way up to the Supreme Court. During
the course of the litigation, the judges involved produced five responses to
the apparent clash between the statute and the defense based on the first
amendment. The first of these was articulated in the trial judge's charge to
the jury, which formed one of the bases for appeal. A statement in confer-
ence, which formed the substance of the disputed charge, is as follows:
... Some of the teachings of the defendants, representations, might seem
extremely improbable to a great many people. . . .As far as this cotit
sees the issue, it is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote
or taught in their classes. They [the jury] are not going to be permitted
to speculate on the actuality of the happening of those incidents .... The
issue is: Did these defendants honestly .aiid in good faith believe these
13. Compare Dolan v. Hurley, 283 Fed. 695 (D. Mass. 1922) on the pefinissibility
of selling lucky stones. "
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things? If they did, they should be acquitted.... If these defendants did
not believe these things, [if] they did not believe Jesus came down and
dictated, or that Saint Germain came down and dictated, and did not
believe the things that they wrote, the things that they preached, but
used the mails for the purpose of getting money, the jury should find
them guilty.1
This view of the problem, which can be labeled the deceitful defendant
position, identifies as a jury issue the question whether the defendants lied
about their beliefs in order to obtain money. The nature of religion is an
irrelevant consideration, since the court conceives of the statute as punishing
those who use the mails for personal deceitful aggrandizement. Once the
mails have been used, the inquiry for fraud requires an examination, not of
the representations of the religion itself, but of the degree of belief the leaders
have in them, even in the absence of explicit criteria for a determination of
amount of belief.
Speaking for a majority of the Ninth Circuit on appeal from conviction,
Judge Mathews offered a second judicial response.
The issues were (1) whether defendants and Guy W. Ballard devised
the scheme described... ; (2) whether, for the purpose of executing the
scheme, they used the mails... ; (3) whether they conspired to commit
any of the offenses charged . .. ; (4) whether . . . any party . . . com-
mitted any ... overt acts.15
Because the question "whether such representations were false or true" was
not submitted to the jury, the Ninth Circuit granted a new trial.16
Such a view of the problem, which may be called the factual fraud position,
seems to look to the effects that the judges feel the statute was designed to
prevent. Unlike the deceitful defendant approach the factual fraud position
does not examine motive but rather requires an inquiry into the truth or
falsity of the representations claimed to be religious. It explicitly rejects the
fusing of misrepresentation and intent, and considers the manner of reaching
a finding of fraud in this area indistinguishable from the inquiry to be made
about any other deceitful commercial scheme.
These judicial positions present two sets of analytic difficulties: The first
is the conjunction of religion and truth. What type of representations are
capable of being fraudulent? What do we look for in finding fraud? When a
belief is offered as "religious," what is being represented? Or, is there no
such thing as a "religious" statement for the purposes of the law? Granted
that there are statements which may be classified as religious statements, can
they be deceitful? The second set questions the factual basis for a finding of
fraud. What type of claims and representations are factual in such a manner
that they are for the jury? If the evaluation of a religion is involved, is this
not a matter involving the First Amendment? In the realm of beliefs not
14. Record, mipra note 1, at vol. 1, pp. 402-03, vol. 3, pp. 1475-76, 1545.




claimed to be supported by science or other "objective" disciplines, what is the
nature of misrepresentation ?17
Judge Denman, in denying a motion for rehearing, seemed to try to bridge
the gap between the deceitful defendant and factual fraud positions.
It would be strong evidence in support of this issue of mental condition
of belief, that these transactions with Jesus actually occurred in their
presence. The right to produce such evidence was denied appellants [by
the ruling that] . . . they [the jury] are not going to be permitted to
speculate on the actuality of the happenings of these incidents.... Here
we have not only the exclusion of proof and instruction to disregard facts
which would strongly tend to support an honest belief that they happened,
but a suggestion of their improbability. The error is as prejudicial to the
issue of honest belief as to the issue of purposeful misrepresentation. 8
In brief, Denman suggested that the examination of the accuracy of the
representations could have been utilized not only for completing the first ele-
ment of the crime, the misrepresentation of fact, but also the second element
of the crime, the intent to defraud. Such an analysis suggests that the im-
probability of truth should have an effect upon a decision as to the honesty
of belief.'0 Judge Denman argues that exclusion of factual examination of the
religious representations is prejudicial rather than lenient, and that rather
than shifting a burden of proof, it offers them an opportunity guaranteed as a
right. In Judge Denman's view, then, to deny that religion can be an objec-
tive part of every day life is to deny freedom of religion. The implication of
his opinion is that religious beliefs are susceptible to ordinary discrimina-
tions, so that a factual examination can lead to a finding of fraud in matters
of religion. But such a view may dictate a particular meaning for "religion,"
and seems to rest on the assumption that there are ways of clearly showing
that a belief is not religious, or that if it is religious, it is "false."
At the Supreme Court, where the decision was reversed and remanded to
the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, three more responses emerged. Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, focused on the first amendment
and solved the case on narrow grounds, fashioning a view that might be called
religious reservation.2 0 Mr. Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices Roberts
17. In a different approach, Judge Stephens dissented from the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision, merely saying that he was "not convinced that the judge's comments and instruc-
tions upon the decisive point of the majority opinion were not more favorable to the
defendants than the law required." 138 F.2d at 545. He thus suggested that such an
instruction could avoid issues of religious freedom while presenting enough support for
a conviction. His reasoning must have been that the defendants weren't put to the proof
or defense of their representations--just their honesty. But to say that the question of
what is believed can be separated from the question of what is believable seems to carry
three implications. (1) That it is impossible to believe that what one is saying is false,
and still to tell the truth. (2) That, in fact, the jury could conclude that the defendants
were lying both in intention and reality. (3) That, in this case, the idea that the Ballards
could believe what they were claiming was a generous notion.
18. Id. at 546.
19. See dissenting opinion by Jackson, J., in, Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944).
20. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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and Frankfurter in dissent,2 1 combined elements of the deceitful defendant
and factual fraud positions into what might be called the clearly culpable
theory. Mr. Justice Jackson, in a separate dissent, 22 took a lunds-off ap-
proach.2
3
The Chief Justice stated his basic position in the first sentence of his dis-
sent. "I am not prepared to say the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
religion affords immunity from criminal prosecution for the fraudulent pro-
curement of money by false statement as to one's religious experience, more
than it renders polygamy or libel immune from criminal prosecutions." 24 He
gave as an example a statement about Ballard meeting Saint Germain at a
particular place and time when it could be clearly proved that Ballard was
elsewhere. This is a kind of factual fraud. But he also said that "certainly
none of respondents' constitutional rights are violated if they are prosecuted
for the fraudulent procurement of money by false representations as to their
beliefs, religious or otherwise. '2 5 This argument recasts the prosecution, by
conceiving of the fraud as depending upon whether the defendants actually
believed their own representations. If the jury finds that the defendants did
not believe their representations to be true, then they have misrepresented a
fact. Their intent becomes a representation.
The clearly culpable position thus holds that if it is clear to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt that an item is false as represented, be it belief or what is
believed, then the jury has a sufficient factual basis on which to find fraud.
Such a theory implies that representations can be divorced from their religious
context and that such separated representations can be objectively judged by
a jury. That theory perhaps rests primarily on a concern for those who join
the religion in the hope of receiving the benefits which have been represented
as flowing from it. Given misrepresentations that enticed these people to join,
the Chief Justice found that religion did not comprise a defense to the pres-
entation of evidence any more than it would for bigamy. He saw religion as
in no way altering an investigation for fraudulent representation.
21. Id. at 88. Interestingly enough, Chief Justice Stone's position was followed by
the majority on remand from the Supreme Court in the decision below. 152 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1945). Further, a Lawyer's Edition annotation cites Ballard for what appears
to be his view. 96 L. Ed. 968, 974 (1952). The opinion of the lower court on remand was
later reversed on totally different grounds, the exclusion of women from the jury. 329
U.S. 187 (1946). See also 35 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
22. 322 U.S. at 92.
23. In about the only comment on, these responses, Justice Brennan stated, "The
dilemma presented by the case was severe ... [vis-a-vis] close adherence to the neutrality
principle." School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 245 (1963). But, accompanying
this comment on the case are two mistaken descriptions as to the requested instructions
and affirmance of conviction. Thus, his characterization should not be read as exhaustive
of the issues and factors in the litigation. See his comment in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 615 (1961).
24. 322 U.S. at 88-89.
25. Id. at 90.
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Mr. Justice Douglas took another tack. He was concerned with the demands
of the first amendment, and did not consider whether the fact that challenged
representations occurred in the context of a claimed religious movement would
affect an examination for fraud. With Justices Black, Reed, Murphy, and
Rutledge, the liberal wing of the court, he held that the first amendment com-
manded exclusion of evidence as to the truth or falsity of the Ballards' re-
ligious credos.
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Man may believe what
they cannot prove .... Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others .... So we conclude that the
District Court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all questions
concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines of the
respondents.-
For Mr. Justice Douglas, the first amendment compels religious reserva-
tion-any examination of a religion's "truth" for whatever purposes is for-
bidden by the Constitution.
But although he repudiated the circuit court's factual fraud approach, Mr.
Justice Douglas did not reach the trial court's deceitful defendant view.2
Offering no criteria for determining either what is "religious" or what com-
prises an actual "submission" to the jury, he rejected explicitly the proposi-
tion that religious propositions are susceptible to normal factual examination.
Such a rejection makes a curious contrast with the position taken by the
Chief Justice. Whereas the Chief Justice said that religion should not serve to
shield a defendant from a conviction for a criminal offense, Mr. Justice Doug-
las said that religion can not so serve, because the Constitution forbids anal-
ysis of the issues by a jury. Thus, while the Chief Justice regards religion
merely as a factor to consider in a scheme of representations, Mr. Justice
Douglas would exclude it from the trial altogether. Whereas Mr. Justice
Douglas does not consider whether leaders' beliefs are part of the religion, the
Chief Justice considers them only as representations connected with a fraud.
The motif of Mr. Justice Jackson's hands-off attack can be found in his
last sentence: "I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this busi-
ness of judicially examining other people's faith. '23 His epigrammatic attacks
can be used as a basis for rejecting the alternative positions and for beginning
the elaboration of an answer to the issues posed by Ballard and suggested in
general by the first amendment's religious commands. Mr. Justice Jackson
viewed the problem from the vantage of the movement itself. He argued
implicitly against the separation of particular representations from the religion
as a whole, and explicitly against the view that religion did not cut across
the grain of all the legal issues in the case. His main attack was levelled at the
deceitful defendant position. First, he pointed out the difficulty of establishing
the amount of sincerity in a religious belief. "I do not know what degree of
26. Id. at 86-88.
27. Id. at 88.
28. 322 U.S. at 95.
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skepticism or disbelief in a religious representation amounts to actionable
fraud .... When does less than full belief in a professed credo become action-
able fraud" ?29 Second, Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that "any inquiry into
intellectual honesty in religion raises profound psychological problems . . .
[Religion's] vitality is in the religious experiences of many people." 30 Third,
he emphasized that really religious people may not be sincere in the normal
use of the word. "Even the most regular of them (unconventional religious
teachers) are sometimes accused of taking their orthodoxy with a grain of
salt."31
Historically, many have not considered belief necessary either to the honesty
of a position taken or its truth. Freud, on one occasion, confessed that he
lacked certainty concerning the truth of what he affirmed, stating only that his
methodology dictated the answers he gave. In Poland, a "Messiah" recanted
under Catholic pressure, and some of his followers still kept faith. The "dark
night of the soul" is well known to many who are commonly accepted as
religious. Further, the deceitful defendant position mistakes what religion is
and the claim it makes on people. Religion is a body of beliefs and affirmations
rather than a description of a leader or his opinions. To ask a man to believe
your religion does not mean that you ask him to believe you or to believe
that you believe, but to assent to propositions represented as being that
religion. The quality of the leader's beliefs and motives are not a necessary
part of a religious system, except perhaps as an example or inspiration.
It is possible to talk of a deceitful defendant in a way which minimizes
inquiry into degree of belief or sincerity, as ordinarily understood. One may
contrast Freud, the Polish messiah, and the agnostic or even atheistic priest
---each of whom seems to be caught up in the existential involvements of re-
ligion or truth-seeking-to a venal businessman, whose only apparent concern
is making money, not religious truth- The latter creates a system which will
earn him the largest amount of income, and is neither involved in an evalua-
tion of the truth or falsity of religious experience nor concerned with offer-
ing his religion for people to evaluate its truth. We could not ask about his
"degree of belief" because, for him, such a question is irrelevant. Would his
prosecution transgress the values which support Jackson's refutation of the
deceitful defendant position?
To find fraud when a leader states "I believe," it is necessary to show two
things: first, that the "I believe" is one of the foundations of the religion on
which the people are asked to base their assent; second, that a non-religious
standard by which the leader invites proof of his belief demonstrates his dis-
belief when applied to him. Only infrequently is the belief of the leaders
offered as a basis for popular assent. Moreover, the first amendment precludes
us from establishing religious standards to evaluate religions or the degree of
belief involved. So, even in the extreme case in which evidence is presented
29. Id. at 93, 95.
30. Id. at 93.
31. Id. at 95. See also id. at 94.
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as to the leader's disclaimed or disengaged belief, in the absence of a showing
that the leader represented his belief as verifiable by some non-religious per-
spective, and that that perspective proves his non-belief, we cannot convict
him for fraud.3 2
The factual fraud position is refuted summarily in Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion.
Belief in what one may demonstrate to the senses is not faith. All
schools of religious thought make enormous assumptions, generally on
the basis of revelations .... The appeal in such matters is to a very dif-
ferent plane of credulity than is invoked by representations of a secular
fact in commerce. 33
In short, religious representations are not like other representations and fraud
cannot be predicated on them.
From the factual fraud refutation comes the destruction of the clearly
culpable position. Since, in fact, religious representations are not like others
it is not at all clear that preachers such as the Ballards can defraud their
followers in the ordinary sense of that term or that there can be a particular
item of deceit to locate. Mr. Justice Jackson rejected looking at those who
joined the religion as people who entered searching for particular benefits
which were misrepresented. "If the members of the sect get comfort from the
celestial guidance of their 'Saint Germain' . . . it is hard to say that they do
not get what they pay for .... The chief wrong which false prophets do to
their following is not financial."' 34 The Ballards offered a system or at least
an accumulation of beliefs. As a religion, its "selling point" was its effect
taken as a whole. Isolating individual items is a method which ignores the
nature of religious participation. The dissection or examination of a religion
to discover what advantages were claimed is precisely what the Constitution
forbids.35
Finally, standing alone, the religious reservation position enunciated by Mr.
Justice Douglas falls as well. The religious issue permeates the whole prose-
cution. To follow the first amendment's command forbidding an examina-
tion of religion only by proscribing a jury charge relating to religion does
not meet the problem.
In the first place, as a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not
see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considera-
tions as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one be-
lieves his statements is to show that they have been true in his experience.
Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that
what he said happened never did happen .... If we try religious sincerity
32. Mr. Justice Jackson in this connection raised many problems. First, he pointed
out that an examination of sincerity raises serious difficulties in psychological fact find-
ing. Second, he suggested that leader's belief in a religion is rarely a tenet of the religion.
Finally, he stated that any examination of sincerity necessarily requires an examination
of the religion itself.
33. 322 U.S. at 94.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 95.
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severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very con-
siderations which in common experience provide its most reliable an-
swer.
86
This position suggests that keeping the issue of the truth of the doctrine from
the jury is prejudicial on the issue of the sincerity of belief. Reservation of
the matter will not work since the heresy trial continues, Mr. Justice Jackson
implies, if we question their sincerity. Since religion cannot help but be in-
volved in an examination of sincerity of belief, the Douglas position cannot
save the prosecution from first amendment objections.
Mr. Justice Jackson's positive position can be inferred from his attacks. He
recognizes and deals with the problem that poor people appear to have been
bilked by the Ballards' activity.
I doubt if the vigilance of the law is equal to making money stick by
over-credulous people....
The wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims
part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get.
But that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of
the prosecutor.3a
This argument suggests that religion is a domain wholly separate from others,
in which traditional standards of fraud do not apply. "Belief in what one may
demonstrate to the sense is not faith."38 Transactions which involve money
for religious beliefs-matters of faith-are not in any way reducible to normal
transactions, and so the whole inquiry into that realm must be excluded.
The trouble with this inferred position is that it provides no standards for
defining faith or religion, and does not focus sharply enough on the issue of
what constitute religious and/or fraudulent representations. The fraud orig-
inally alleged in the case concerned various representations; the representa-
tions, not necessarily the religion as a whole, may have induced people to
part with their money. Stone maintained that those representations can be
treated separately from the religion. The prosecutor based his argument, in
part, on the view that the religion was a cloak for specific misrepresentations
dealing with medicine, politics, and certain catastrophic happenings, as well
as a tissue of implausible stories about Christian figures. Is it possible to
separate these representations? Can a representation be both religious and
fraudulent?
More generally, what is "religious"? Can a man legally sell drugs, claiming
on the front of the label that they cure cancer, and on the back that God told
him this? Can religion be used as a defense to a substantive crime? A man
may defend by saying that God told him to murder, but is it sufficient if he
36. Id. at 92-93. As an example of this point, the actual trial is ideal. In proving the
lack of sincerity, the prosecutor compared the "ascended masters" of the movement to
Charlie McCarthy, the puppet, Superman and Flash Gordon, while suggesting that their
method of ascension was stolen by Donald Ballard from Popular Mechanics. Record,
mtpra note 1, at 1211, 1237, 1503.
37. Id. at 94, 95.
38. Id. at 94.
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announces the basis for his action only after the act? 39 Was the Catholic
Church not pronouncing religious dogma when it told Galileo to recant?
Aren't things demonstrated to the senses often a matter of faith? How do I
discover the motives of a man buying? If I buy rotten meat on a type of faith
in the advertisement am I still not gypped? Could a butcher defend the sale
if he could prove that I thought God ordered me to buy the particular rotten
piece of meat, so I got what I wanted? Suppose I solicit funds and ask you
to join my religion saying I will meet St. Jerome or the books I sell you tell
about St. Jerome and when I am supposed to meet him I am elsewhere or
the book has nothing but blank pages? These questions exemplify the difficulty
in separating demonstrations to the senses from appeals to faith, in using
motives of buyer or seller as relevant to fraud, and in denying that some fol-
lowers do rely on the existence of concrete benefits from the religion, and
believe that concrete events claimed by the religious leaders to have occurred
did occur.
The beginning of an answer to the conflict between constitutional mandate
and statutory proscription lies in the realization that propositions bring with
them implicit presuppositions. Concepts arrive in contexts. To describe or
discuss anything implies some type of meeting ground, some commonality of
experience and vocabulary. Religious belief provides one such experience and
vocabulary; science, another; philosophy, yet another and so on. Intellectual
disciplines provide a perspective and system from which we derive the mean-
ing of particular entities. A particular object, or even a particular idea has a
different nature depending on the context or the perspective of the discipline
or disciplines from which we approach it. A cup of wine may be religious or
profane depending on what one does in relation to it.
Given this understanding, we can describe a fraudulent representation. For
our immediate purposes, such a misrepresentation may occur in two ways:
(a) I can misrepresent the results that a given discipline achieves. I can say
that water tests out chemically as H2 SO 4 in my laboratory. (b) I can mis-
represent what discipline or world perspective I work in. As a layman I can
say, "Speaking medically, I will cure you of cancer." Thus fraud may be
perpetrated either by misrepresenting what perspective is brought to a prob-
lem, or what results obtain therein.
Religion is one type of perspective. Religious expression involves assent
to propositions that define the world we live in. A cross, a cup of wine, a
candle, a baby's cry, sex,-all have different meanings in different religions
for different people. To recognize the plurality of faiths is to recognize the
plurality of possible descriptions of these things. What may be a scientific
39. The recent case approving a judicial act which forced a transfusion on a Jehovah's
Witness is worth considering here. Application of the President and Directors of George-
town College Inc., A Body Corporate, - F2d - (D.C. Cir., Feb. 3, 1963)
(Misc. No. 2189). Though solved on different grounds, this case seemingly pitted a per-
son's own notion of his meaning in life and what death was to him against the state's
interest in his life. The opinion explicitly acknowledges that religious people have no
license to commit suicide when non-religious people have no such right.
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aberration to some is a miracle to others. Bad history may be divine scrip-
tures.
Yet to define the limits of religious expression may be impossible if philoso-
phically desirable. Moreover, any definition of religion would seem to violate
religious freedom in that it would dictate to religions, present and future,
what they must be: inability to give an authoritative definition is justified by
the conjunction of the first amendment's two religious clauses. Read together,
they define religious freedom but do not establish religion as a defined domain.
That is, religious freedom is served by allowing a completely open realm for
defining religion rather than by establishing a domain or definition in which
religions can freely operate. Furthermore, an attempt to define religion, even
for purposes of increasing freedom for religions, would run afoul of the "estab-
lishment" clause, as excluding some religions, or even as establishing a notion
respecting religion. How then can we handle the problem of claims labeled
"religious" in domains where other authorities are generally accepted, where
people do not normally assent to perceive an experience in a religious way?
Since we are prevented from prescribing what claims are "religious" by
delimiting the bounds of religion, we can only say that those claims are
"religious" that are clearly so, either by virtue of their characteristics or ex-
plicit labels that lead to recognition of them as such. Since religion is tradi-
tionally an area of faith and assent, we may say that a religious claim is one
which asks for adherence on the grounds of religious truth, or one which is
defined or spoken by its author as religious. Because religion can be in con-
flict with other disciplines, because it cuts across everyday life, we can only
know that a claim is based on religion when we are told that it is. The legal
basis for stating that a claim is in the religious domain can be that it is held
out as being religious in nature. Such a conception enables us to avoid judicial
prescription of the range of religion as well as jury decisions on the question
of whether a claim is an issue of "fact" or of "religious belief."
If we combine our notion of fraudulent representations with our conception
of religious expression within a legal system predicated upon toleration of all
forms of that expression, we obtain the result that there can be no fraud in
matters of religious belief. For we grant men the right to choose their religious
perspective-a perspective which tells them what the nature of things is. Fur-
ther, this perspective provides its own standard of application-to say that
some water is "holy" is to say that using the standards of that religion the
water is "holy." Since all standards are possible, no description using such a
standard can be fraudulent. These conclusions follow from two guidelines:
first, religion comes to a believer from the act of commitment by faith, a type
of assumption and assent, not a persuasion by a series of demonstrations to
reason; second, religion defines for itself the meaning of the commonplace.
Its definitions are not representations but rather an integral part of the per-
ceived reality of experience generated by the perspective that religion brings




Of course not every claim touching upon religion would be protected. A
man can misrepresent his authoritative basis-he can fail to make it clear
that his claim is based on "religion." If a man simply sells bad drugs and
defends on religious grounds, we can find his defense insufficient. For we say:
first, you failed to define your claims as religious and they were claims of a
nature that would not ordinarily be understood as religious; second, holding
yourself out as a drug salesman implied that you spoke with medical authority.
To defend now that the drugs you sold were good on religious grounds
requires that you must have affirmatively and clearly shown to people at the
time of sale that the value of the drugs was rooted in a religious system
which they had to affirm in order to perceive that value. If a man pretends to
speak with authority he does not have, or acts in such a way as to imply that
he speaks with that authority, he is guilty of misrepresentation and fraud.
When a man acts publicly in a domain where the normal expectations are of
secular contentions, he must make it clear that his claims are made as elements
of a faith which describes the nature of things about which he is making the
claims. Since the Constitution prohibits defining an area of belief as "reli-
gious," a man must make it clear that the beliefs he represents are "religious"
if he wants to be free to express them under the constitutional warrant of
freedom of religious belief. He has the burden of communicating that he
speaks only from the authority of religion. But, once such a burden has been
met, then we cannot attack the particular aspects of his faith as fraudulent.
We examine the representation in terms of its authoritative referent and
predicate fraud accordingly.
What a man presents as a religious claim, then, cannot be attacked. It is
only when he makes a representation beyond religious authority that we can
apply laws of fraud. For these purposes we employ only the minimal under-
standing of religious activity for the law that it involve an assent of faith to
dogmas and propositions that offer some orientation as to the nature of things.
This minimal understanding of principles of claiming religious protection
together with the concepts that ideas imply contexts and that man is legally
responsible for what he presents himself to be, enables us to hold Mr. Justice
Jackson's hands-off position, using Mr. Justice Douglas' argument prohibiting
"heresy" trials, while avoiding the realization of Mr. Chief Justice Stone's
fear that religion might be used as a cloak for fraud.
We can restate the whole position as follows: A misrepresentation comes
about when false characterizations of the objects discussed are made. Char-
acterizations are made as the result of applying a discipline's perspectives or
standards to perceived objects. The Constitution removes from condemnation
those beliefs that are put forth as religious. If a man clearly presents that
which he wishes others to believe or act upon as religious, the Constitution
prevents a prosecution for misrepresentation.
For the purposes of this analysis, the representations made by the Ballards
can be divided into two major classes. These were those representations which
were clearly a part of the religion-the movement being a religion in that it
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called for an assent of faith to its propositions-without specific labeling as
such. Its representations as to supernatural characteristics and effects upon
the.soul require an assent of faith; they are the sort traditionally said to be
in the religious domain. The tenor of the presentation by the Ballards would
indicate these are a matter of faith. No proof that these representations were
"religious" can be made rigorously-each statement was not preceded by a
formal call to faith or a formal labeling of religion. That they called for an
assent can be seen by using traditional conceptions of faith or by examining
the presentation. To make a common sense decision whether a movement is
a religion and a claim clearly religious, we look in general to: (a) whether
the movement claims through an asking for assent (a rigorous proof of re-
ligion would probably refer to grounds of assent) ; (b) "supernatural" claims
traditionally connected with religion; (c) whether the traditional customary
activities and trappings of "religion" are present. These forms of representa-
tion may be classed as "religious," even if not explicitly held out as related to
faith, because they are early recognizable by the person represented to as
associated with such a form of assent.
The second broad class of representations were not clearly part of the re-
ligion. This class itself breaks down into two categories: those representations
which might be said to have induced people to join the religion by forming
a "factual" basis for belief in the religion and those representations that were
of a sort usually strongly associated with non-religious perspectives. The first
variety included allegations of the type that worried the Chief justice-for
example, that Guy Ballard had met St. Germain on Mt. Shasta. This historical
event seems like an item which if true would be a reason to believe in Guy
Ballard's connection with the divine and a reason to join his faith. Such a
"fact" might be undermined by proof that Guy Ballard was in St. Louis at
the time. I might say "Chemists agree that I can transform water into sul-
phuric acid. I am a miracle worker. Worship me." Such a scientific claim
would then be the offered basis for assuming the religious belief. The second
sub-class is comprised of propositions that most people in a common sense
way, or in a way informed by various disciplines, find factually absurd. More-
over, they are propositions that one normally finds discussed in particular
contexts of other disciplines. Throughout the case scoffing remarks were made
about the Ballards' preference for blue, about the claim that they prevented a
San Francisco earthquake, sunk a submarine, could help heal and other
achievements.
Should any of these representations be found fraudulent? The first broad
class, which would be understood even without explicit labeling as religious,
clearly must be immune from the application of the statute. In the second
broad class, the second sub-class of claims gives no trouble, for these were
consistently identified with the religious perspective. Granting freedom of re-
ligion to include religious beliefs in all realms, beliefs are not susceptible to
being called fraud when they are clearly identified as part of a religion, how-
ever unusual such an identification. The most "preposterous" remarks are
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safe precisely because faith is free. But the first sub-class of claims raises
difficulties. These representations sound like facts which, if proved true by
specified non-religious perspectives, comprise reasons to make a general, as-
sent of faith. The examination for fraud of representations founding a creed
is an examination whether acceptance of them can be totally predicated on
other standards and whether they are so held out. Under the preceding anal-
ysis such a representation totally based and justified on a false application of
non-religious standards would appear to be fraudulent. If in this first sub-
class we can show that the statement was held out as a factual, not a religious,
foundation for assent and that the asserted factual basis has been intentionally
misrepresented, then we have isolated a representation upon which a prose-
cution may be based.
The reasons for excluding statements identified by their characteristics or
presentation as "religious" from "fraud" is a general fear of "heresy trials."
If we allow juries to categorize what representations are really not part of the
religion, but were claimed to be facts, then we give license to prosecutions
against religious freedom. Rather, it is safer to say that once a movement has
clearly been identified with religious overtones to those who hear the repre-
sentations, we will accept the fact that all the movements' representations
come warranted as religious, and entice only as they evoke response and
recognition. Though such an account may do violence to the way people actu-
ally judge religions for themselves and even to what religion "is," it preserves
religious freedom. We cannot allow discriminations in a religion betveen
representations justified by recourse to that religion and representations justi-
fied by the application of objective standards, so long as assent and affirmation
is sought overall. As the historical claim that Christ arose from the dead is
clearly religious, so is any claim which founds a religion so long as it is
ultimately connected with assent and other religious concomitants. Only if a
claim is clearly taken out of the religious domain by specifically and explicitly
representing it as objectively verifiable by others without faith, applying stand-
ards drawn from other domains, can we have a fraudulent representation. Even
then, prosecution must be couched in terms of the man who makes the fraud-
ulent claim and then seeks the shelter of religion, and not in terms of the
religion whose shelter he seeks. Religious freedom dictates that we may not
divorce particular representations from a religion taken as a whole, nor may
we call them fraudulent when they carry with them a religious warrant. We
look to the presentation of the representation to see if its context suggests
"religious" connections.
The principle discovered - that the law must not entertain descriptions and
accounts of religion - not only solves the problems of the prosecution for re-
ligious fraud raised by Ballard, but also serves as the foundation for a realistic
approach to a more general application of the first amendment freedoms of
religion. A constitutional prohibition against assessing or regulating belief
clearly labeled as religious exempts religious belief from prosecution. But what
manifestations of this religious belief are protected? The exemption has its
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application in the public world, where action takes place and is regulated. A
crucial problem is that of the distinction between religious belief and public
action. A traditional feeling about the world of law and the world of religion
is that the state may not interfere in the world of religion but that when a man
participates in the world of public life he must meet its secular and legal
standards. How is one to tell which world one is in and when one crosses
over?
Law we can say is yet another perspective, but an unusual one. Rather than
a descriptive framework, it is, loosely speaking, a prescriptive system for
action. It demands and proscribes particular activities-establishes norms of
action. Lawyers apply the demands and proscriptions. There is no defense to
the application of law. But, under the Constitution there is an exemption
which applies when the act in question takes place in the realm of belief or
religious perspective.
There is an aspect of our solution to the Ballard case that we need to focus
on in connection with this discussion. Throughout the discussion we talked
of the privacy of an act of affirmation. We did not precisely define what we
meant by privacy nor will we entirely. Rather we have to distinguish three
realms of behavior: (1) the realm of pure belief that everybody would grant
is private; (2) the realm of religious action which may have public manifes-
tations; (3) the realm of action clearly public. It is usually agreed that the
law cannot trifle with the first-no legislature may pass a law commanding
people to believe in God. The issue is either to distinguish the latter two, or
to provide principles to justify legal regulation of the second. We will do the
former.
The distinction in tentative form is: religious action is action the function
of which is only to establish and perpetuate a private meaning for individuals
- a meaning given to it by a religion. Religious actions create results whose
effects are private, felt only by those who believe or are concerned with belief.
Some actions will occur which have real meaning or effect only in the world
of ideas. Thus, purely symbolic actions may be distinguished from actions, such
as polygamous cohabitation, which have tangible, worldly consequences. And
among those actions which effect only the world of ideas are religious actions,
defined as such by the religion which adopts them. That is, religious action
takes place in but does not exhaust the realm where actions induce, signify,
or reject beliefs. Public action, on the other hand, is that which affects others
in ways not limited to their belief. Further, these effects, for the purpose of
the law, must already have been described, prescribed, or proscribed by an
authoritative decision of the governing political powers. This distinction should
grow in meaning in the following discussion.
Religion serves as no defense to a law regulating what we have defined as
public actions. Only if action can be seen to be exhausted in an individual's
private affirmation, and relates to his assumption of a perspective, is it reli-
gious action and thereby sacrosanct. For example, buying a drug clearly
warranted as "good" by religion and whose contents are not condemned by
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law concerns only the private individual in his belief. Erecting a building
which does not meet public legal requirements is not defensible since that for-
bidden act affects people in a very tangible way if the building falls. In the
first case, absent negative proscriptions, there is only an individual in the
religious world. In the second case, by virtue of the existence of public de-
mands regarding tangible conduct beyond the world of belief, we have activity
in the public world.
West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette 40 would seem to militate against
this distinction. In that case, children of Jehovah's Witnesses had been dis-
missed from school for refusing to salute the American flag although an order
had been passed defining this as a public duty. Some would say that in this
case justice demands that religion not be allowed to function as a defense to
a charge of not complying with a public standard. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent put this point forcefully.
Much that is the concern of temporal authority affects the spiritual in-
terest of men. But it is not enough to strike down a non-discriminatory
law that it may hurt or offend some dissident view. It would be too easy
to cite numerous prohibitions and injunctions to which laws run counter
if the variant interpretations of the Bible were made the tests of obedi-
ence to law. The validity of secular laws cannot be measured by their
conformity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state that
ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right or wrong.41
Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguishes only between the realm of pure belief
and the realm of action clearly public to use this distinction forcefully to
reach his result. His opinion thus serves as a hard testing ground for the
viability of the suggested third realm-that of religious action. The Jehovah's
Witnesses are taught that saluting a flag is sacrilegious idolatry-the flag be-
ing a forbidden "image." The State Board of Education ordered the flag
salute to be "a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools"
with penalties attached for non-performance. Mr. Justice Jackson, for the
majority, seemed to balance the public interest against private interests in the
realm of belief, in the fashion of recent applications of a "balancing test" to
free speech problems.42 His opinion can be read then, as teaching that the
Frankfurter position might be right but that this regulation of opinions is
unconstitutional because unjustified. Yet if this is the case, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's argument that religious rights are irrelevant once one is securely in
the realm of public action is cogent.48
One could, however, find a broader base for decision in this opinion-a
base commensurate with our tripartite distinction. At one point Jackson
discussed the fact that the involvement of creeds is an essential matter in
the case. "If official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed,
40. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41. Id. at 654 (emphasis supplied).
42. Id. at 638, 640, 641.
43. This is particularly true for purposes of a "religious" objection to a regulation
if we refuse to define religion.
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what it shall contain cannot be decided by courts, -but must be largely dis-
cretionary with the ordaining authority, whose power to prescribe would no
doubt include the power to amend. '44 He pointed out, at another place in the
opinion, a focal fact of the case which would help to put the matter in the
realm of privacy in accord with our distinction. "The freedom asserted by
these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any
other individual.... Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior
is peaceable and orderly."45 In terms of the suggested distinction, we might
say that their action of refusal could affect only the beliefs of others. Given the
absence of tangible negative effects upon others, Mr. justice Jackson con-
eluded in the now familiar words that
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception they do not now occur to us.40
The dispute in Barnette narrows sharply to one issue: in the realm of pub-
lic life are there some regulations we will prohibit because of their effect on
religious people? Mr. Justice Jackson found the answer in his opposition to
belief coerced without justification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter found no excep-
tion on the grounds that such a determination interferes with the govern-
ment's proper domain of regulation. Our tentative distinction provides an
answer when we discriminate carefully among .Mr. Justice Jackson's attacks
on the regulation. We can agree with the Frankfurter position that religion
should be no defense to a charge of disobeying public regulations. Yet when
we examine the nature of the public demand in Barnette, we arrive at Mr.
Justice Jackson's conclusions.
The argument is as follows: these people were neither doing something
that is ordinarily regulated, -nor doing something which detracts from the
effectiveness of other regulations, nor avoiding doing something which is
required as a duty to protect others. The first of these observations is rein-
forced by noting that the regulation is aimed at the realm of beliefs. The latter
two are strengthened by recognizing Mr. Justice Jackson's point that a refusal
to salute does not interfere with the rights of others. It therefore lacks the
characteristics of public action in that it has no effect on people beyond the
44. 319 U.S. at 634.
45. Id. at 630.
46. Id. at 642. To Mr. Justice Jackson's famous rhetoric Mr. Justice Frankfurter
answered with his notion of religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. "[N]o
religion shall either receive the state's support or incur its hostility. Religion is outside
the sphere of political government. This does not mean that all matters on which religious
organizations or beliefs may pronounce are outside the sphere of government." Id. at 654.
He further replies: "Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute. But
neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation."
Id. at 670. Mr. Justice Jackson was challenged to find something beyond notions of free
expression on which to base invalidation of this regulation. It is, in part, this challenge
that is answered by discrimination among beliefs for a religious defense.
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realm of their beliefs. Rather, the Board was calling on the Witnesses to
affirm something against their will. They presented the children with a sym-
bol and told them to act towards it in a certain way and invest it with a
meaning of particular sort. A religion forbade such affirmations.
It is important to note exactly what type of action was called for. Its
nature might have been more apparent if the required posture were more
traditional. Suppose the regulation had required the children to kneel, fold
their hands, close their eyes, and recite the pledge. A different position of
hand than most people use to pray by does not make a ritual less a prayer.
The action called for was one of private dedication rather than public par-
ticipation. It defined a posture, a creed towards objects, symbols and beliefs.
In short, this pledge had manifestations which are only cognizable by those
who believe or those who are concerned with the beliefs of others. Such action
was proscribed by the- Jehovah's Witnesses.
Once it is granted that the Jehovah's Witnesses are a religion (since they
both hold themselves out to be one and are easily recognizable as such) we
can say that their refusal to salute is justifiable, not as a defense to a public
demand on the ground of religion, but rather on the ground that the public
standard invades that particular religion's particularly religious characteris-
tics. Since the regulation achieves that impact with no justification other than
encouraging the attitude of patriotism, it is invalid under the first amendment.
We are not presented with a clash of perspective resulting from a legal
definition of public results, but rather a clash which owes its origin to a
regulation which defines actions designed to perpetuate a private meaning in
conflict with a religion's private meaning.
This analysis does not use religion as a defense, but uses these religious
objectors as an example to show that this regulation does invade the religious
domain and involves no compensating public aspect. Law-makers may not
themselves define what is a religion, nor can courts define what is an invasion
of religious freedom in the abstract. But the religious objectors allow us to
assess the public nature of this regulation. An affirmation is private, this
regulation of affirmation is not a regulation of public action but an entrance
into the religious sphere. Having no warrant in regard to public action the
regulation must fall as prohibited once it can be shown that it invades a pri-
vate realm, and seeks to order that realm in a manner contrary to an order
imposed by a religion. In short, in the absence of a public justification, what
condemns this regulation is its calling for affirmations. This the Justices con-
demn on free speech grounds. But we can go farther and suggest that it also
may be condemnable under the "establishment" clause of the first amend-
ment. The regulation's invasion of free speech suggests the establishing of a
system of perspectives and affirmations. The Jehovah's Witnesses, by their
objections, demonstrate that this system can have religious connotations and
suggest an establishment question.47 Yet we need not go that far. What this
47. It is not clear whether the establishment question was at issue. An injunction
was issued "restraining the State Board of Education from enforcing against them a
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case shows is that the first amendment's guarantee of religious freedom pre-
vents the establishing of purely ritualistic actions or affirmations which can
be shown to clash with a particular religion. In other words, religion can
serve as a ground for attack or defense against public regulations when those
regulations are formulated purely in the realm of affirmation and ritualistic
posture.48
In defining the relation of religion and law under the aegis of the Consti-
tution we have examined and defined what types of assaults religion is pro-
tected against, what comprises its defensible integrity and exemptions. To
arrive at a fuller understanding of the functioning of religion in the context
of legality it is necessary to explore the way in which religion may infect a
legal situation, or a religious institution participate in a public process. We
have focused on the individual's freedom to ask for any affirmation of belief
commensurate with standards of public action. The question that arises
naturally is the converse: What benefits may a religion claim, if it meets
public standards for the granting of benefits? The famous "School Bus" case,
Everson v. Board of Educ.,49 offers an answer. Written by Justice Black, it
is perhaps the most difficult decision in this area, and perhaps the most bril-
liant.
Before we approach that case, one preliminary case must be understood.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters 50 involved section 5259 of the Oregon statutes,
regulation of the Board requiring children . . .to salute the American flag." Barnette
v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (1942). The judge's summary,
however, reads without the phrase "against them" although he states the question of the
case as whether or not the Jehovah's Witnesses can "lawfully be required to salute it."
Ibid. The question is whether the ritual was attacked or the compulsion of the children
to participate was held unconstitutional.
48. There is a sense in which any government establishment of ritual raises prob-
lems in the area of establishment of religion-although without a finding that religion
is involved, the ritual is perhaps not assailable as such. Two separate concurrences sug-
gest a concern with the meaning of establishing rituals relevant to belief. Mr. Justice
Black, for himself and Mr. Justice Douglas, stated: "Religious faiths, honestly held, do
not free individuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which
are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and pressingly
imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibition merely regulate time, place
or manner of religious activity." 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1942). That pledge Mr. Justice
Black regarded as a "test oath" and found "abhorrent," forbidden by the first amend-
ment. His opinion notes that private rights underlie religious freedom. Mr. Justice Murphy
puts the stress elsewhere. In a phrase suggesting Mr. Justice Black's general theory of
amendments as commands he stated, "I have no loftier duty or responsibility than to up-
hold that spiritual freedom in its farthest reaches." Id. at 645. To this end he suggested
a test. "I am impelled to conclude that such a requirement is not essential to the
maintenance of effective government and orderly society." Ibid. Mr. Justice Murphy also
mentioned private rights. "To many it is deeply distasteful to join in a public chorus of
affirmation of private belief.... I am unable to agree that the benefits that may accrue
to society from the compulsory flag salute are sufficiently definite and tangible to justify
the invasion of freedom and privacy that is entailed." Id. at 645-46.
49. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
50. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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which compelled all children between eight and sixteen to attend public
schools. Two schools, one parochial, the other private, contested the con-
stitutionality of this statute before the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds, for a unanimous court, affirmed a decree which had declared the
statute unconstitutional; to reach this result he used the first amendment,
applying it to the state law through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend
some school .. .and [to require] that nothing be taught which is mani-
festly inimical to the public welfare.5 '
Having thus defined the state's permissible sphere of supervision of educa-
tion in abstract terms, Mr. Justice McReynolds went on to say "that the child
is not merely a creature of the state. Those who rear him have the right
and the duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 52 If a
school fulfills certain public standards, the state has exhausted its legal in-
terest in those who attend them. The state has a right to set educational
standards, but not to dictate where they are to be fulfilled or what accom-
panying characteristics must be. More specifically, the case limited the state's
power to control what a student learns.
Mr. Justice McReynolds seems to have justified this conclusion by refer-
ence to a conception of parental right to choose the school to which they send
their children. Perhaps the rationale is that because the rights involved are
inherent in individuals, state regulations impinging them must be limited to
what is required by the public purpose. Some Catholics have offered the
additional argument in support of the case that religious freedom compels its
holding.5 3 To say that a school must have no religion, they argue, is to teach
a theory of religion-that education and spiritual growth are separate. Such
a theory runs counter to Catholic doctrine. It is thus a denial of Catholic
religious freedom if parochial schools are outlawed. For then Catholics would
be imprinted with a doctrine about religion which they do not accept. If, in
fact, they fulfill the state's standards of education, shouldn't they be permitted
to add on their own conditions? If everyone meets the state's standards and
religious people meet them in their religious way, religion is served. If re-
ligious people are not so allowed, they are forced to practice what they preach
against. Such an argument might call on our distinction of public actions from
religious expression to say that to make Catholics go to a particular school
only affects their beliefs. That conflict with an established religion's beliefs
might be said to invade the domain of religious expression.
The difficulty with this argument is suggested by our earlier discussion
of the conflict of perspectives. Religion is not always a clear or separable
51. Id. at 534.
52. See id. at 535. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
53. Murray, Law or Prepossession, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 30-34, 36-37, 39
(1949).
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domain. Many a public pronouncement may imply a position that a religion
may reject. If the law requires drivers to stay on the right, and a religion
urges the left on grounds that God speaks only to people on the left, the law
forces one to practice what one does not preach. Further, the fact that
Catholics meet some public standards does not in itself justify a conclusion
that they do not have to meet all such standards. In order to justify such a
conclusion, one must show that the religion's demand is separable from the
other public requirements and that the state's demand affecting that religious
demand only affects beliefs. But non-ideological reasons for putting all pupils
in public schools can be found. The state can say that such a requirement is
the most reasonable way to perpetuate public regulation. A regulation com-
pelling parents to send children to particular public standard schools is not
dearly separable from the aim of maintaining those public standards, nor is
it dearly in a realm only affecting belief.
It is perhaps safer to say that once religious beliefs are involved, we should
look carefully, as in the Flag Salute Case, to see that institutions of a religious
nature are not established, and, that in general, we should try to permit maxi-
mum freedom for divergence. Under such a nebulous warrant, we find the
Pierce case, as a matter of law, holding in favor of the freedom to educate up
to standards in whatever place desired-a view bottomed on the parental
right to freedom within the framework of public standards. Public standards
dictate only certain educational requirements.
Given, then, that the state cannot dictate observance beyond its standards
in education, the question arises as to what types of benefits the first amend-
ment permits it to bestow on those agencies which both fulfill its standards
and also partake of a religious nature. It is to this question that Black
addressed himself in the "School Bus" case.5 4 At stake in Everson was the
constitutionality of a New Jersey Board of Education's decision, made under
statutory authority, to reimburse parents for "money expended by them for
the bus transportation of their children on regular buslines operated by the
public transportation system"' 5 to and from schools. The difficulty was that
"part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children
in the community to Catholic parochial schools."5 6 Everson, "in his capacity
as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a state court challenging the right of the
Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students.
'5 7
First, and most important, Mr. Justice Black established that he was ex-
amining the statute, not the particular practice in this town which happened
to result in the giving of money only to Catholic school pupils. The Justice
noted in a crucial footnote that the statute was not challenged under the
equal protection clause for "excluding payment for the transportation of any
54. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).





pupil who attends a 'private school run for profit.' "58 Given the limited
nature of Mr. Justice Black's inquiry it is possible to reconstruct his argu-
ment from parts of the opinion.
The establishment of religion clause, he stated, means that
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion.... No tax. . . can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 9
On the other hand, "That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so
as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."'0 In a situation where the
state acts towards an organization, the question to ask is whether the state's
action is in any sense determined by the religious characteristic of the organi-
zation. If it is, the action or the statute authorizing it is unconstitutional. On
the other hand, if there are public standards, not a function of religion or
belief, religion should furnish no excuse or reason for deviation. Black argued
further that this reasoning applies to the allocation of benefits as well as to
the promulgation of restraints.
Then, Mr. Justice Black asked, is there anything wrong with providing
transportation to children attending schools? He saw no defect. Moreover,
the statute certainly does not fall because of any religious characteristics, as
there are none relevant to the standards in the statute. Since there is nothing
constitutionally objectionable in the standards or statute, there is nothing
wrong with applying the statute to schools which happen to be Catholic. In-
deed, it would be unconstitutional to preclude the giving of aid to Catholic
schools if others received aid. This is the nub of the case. Mr. Justice Black
stated it with a type of reverse English.
While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide trans-
portation only to children attending the public schools, we must be care-
ful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief. 61
In effect, religion cannot be used to prevent extension of "general state law
benefits." Once we find that a statute operates reasonably in dispensing bene-
fits and is not defined by religion, freedom dictates that it be applied equally
to those who mx religion in with the conditions of benefit. The constitutional
mandate does not prevent all persons, religious and non-religious, from re-
58. Id. at n.2 (emphasis added). See also id. at 6.
59. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 18.
61. Id. at 16.
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ceiving those benefits. Indeed, since it is impossible to define a domain for
religion, and since religions may introduce prescriptions into other domains,
to decide the constitutionality of this kind of statute on the basis of "religion"
is to decide on something which is not necessarily or directly at work in the
secular choice itself.
Mr. Justice Black had yet another point to make.
State-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from
church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much
the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions
intended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the state deems
to be best for the school children's welfare.62
One could object that the policemen direct the traffic for the sake of order
as well as for the sake of children, but this would not destroy the analogy
between police protection and public transportation. Both function to facilitate
choices of where to go, and both are justified if extended without predication
on religious preference. It provides a public freedom to choose means, not an
aid to the private practice of a state recognized religion.
Mr. Justice Black stated that there is a "difficulty in drawing the line be-
tween tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the general pub-
lic and that which is designed to support institutions which teach religion."
0 3
In Everson, he had no difficulty.
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the
opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public pur-
pose. ... Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a public
purpose because it provides that tax raised funds will be paid to reim-
burse individuals on account of money spent by them in a way which
furthers a public program. . . . Subsidies and loans to individuals such
as farmers and home owners, and to privately owned transportation sys-
tems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been common-
place practices in our state and national history.64
Where aid is given directly to institutions for apparently non-religious pur-
poses, the difficulty in "drawing the line" might be heightened by the possi-
bility that the guide for disbursement, which appears not to distinguish on
a religious basis, cloaks a practical effect of so doing. But in Everson, the
money was given to individuals, not to a church organization. The fact that
it may be employed by individuals to help a church or to further a church
program should be considered irrelevant and in the area of free choice. Ad-
mittedly this is a tenuous, easily blurred, sometimes quantitative distinction;
it is true that aid to individuals could be in fact designed to be aid to a church.
At a minimum, the distinction operates to indicate that the aid allows choice
within a range not proscribed by public standards, rather than furnish aid to
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 7. At this juncture Mr. Justice Black's citation of Cochran v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) is very important. See note 65 infra.
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religion. At a maximum, the distinction indicates that religion is not in-
volved; the reimbursements are just aid to individuals.65
We can restate this part of the argument as follows: having justified the
aid as allowing freedom of choice, there are two agencies of aiding to be
examined. The agency of implementing the choice; the agency for distributing
the benefit. The agency of implementing the choice is public transportation
which is not defined by religion. It functions to serve all, in a way analogous
to the way a policeman serves all. The agency for distributing benefits is the
reimbursement of individuals. This is a traditional way of giving money for
public programs, and as long as it is not predicated on religious discrimina-
tion it certainly does not fall afoul of the establishment clause. The statute is
valid both in terms of the benefits distributed and the agencies chosen.
The soundness of Everson as a holding of law should be manifest, once the
idea of parochial schools fulfilling public educational standards is accepted.
If children can go to those schools they certainly can take buses there. Pierce
suggested the focus on individuals that Black amplified into a distinction.
Going to parochial schools is an acceptable way of fulfilling public standards.
The conjunction of two propositions yields Everson's result: Law demands
only that public standards be fulfilled, not that the perspectives of other
domains be preempted. Public aid for private choice into which religion does
not necessarily enter is acceptable.
We can reformulate the legal argument as follows: the Constitution pro-
hibits aid to r.eligion and support of any state religion. Everson presents a
statute offering benefits to those who meet public standards and, only in-
cidentally to statutory language or purpose, go to church schools. The statute
does not breach the "wall of separation," since (a) the aid it authorized went
to individuals as an expression of public policy towards private choice, (b)
the statute was not defined in terms of religious goals, nor did it discriminate
according to religious characteristics, (c) the benefactors fully met the re-
quirements of the state in all relevant respects.
It is surprising that Mr. Justice Black's position found but a bare majority
of the Court. Mr. Justice Jackson, whom one might have expected to follow,
dissented. He saw the question as "Is it constitutional to tax this complainant
to pay the cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified denomi-
nation?"08 The majority opinion stated that the particular usage was not an
issue in this case.67 Mr. Justice Rutledge was joined by Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson and Burton in a thirty-six page dissent.68 His argument was based
on the analogy of "An appropriation from the public treasury to pay the cost
65. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) declaring con-
stitutional the provision of free public school books to children at private and parochial
schools, also supports the correctness of the Everson holding as a matter of law. In that
case, it was said that "schools . . . are not the beneficiaries"--the children and the state
are. Id. at 375.
66. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 21 (1947).
67. Id. at 4 n.2 and accompanying text.
68. Id. at 28.
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of transportation to Sunday school ... or to the meetings of various young
people's religious societies ... [which] could not withstand the constitutional
attack."' 69 But the analogy was false: this is not aid to exclusively religious
facilities, but aid intended to facilitate the fulfillment of state standards in
facilities recognized by the state as serving its public goals. That these facilities
happen to offer an option as to the mixture of religion in education is irrele-
vant to the public purpose.70
In our framework, the sense of Mr. Justice Black's legal position emerges.
To prevent aid when there is a possibility of encouraging religion would
destroy our conceptual dichotomy of the domains and vitiate the idea that
legal reasoning should proceed on the basis of their separateness even when
both religion and other perspectives apply, in fact, to the same fact situation.
Our position recognizes that, since the state and religions have different per-
spectives and different goals to be achieved by implementing certain regula-
tions, to judge one by the other is to violate the mandate of the first amend-
ment. If, after we have defined our public standards and our public aid ex-
clusive of religious considerations, we then destroy them as a judicial matter
because of some participant's religious characteristics, we once again enter
into a judicial determination of a religious sphere. The fact that aid may foster
the manifestations of belief does not make it aid to private religious expres-
sion. Such aid functions to affect people in a realm apart from belief. Easing
the way to education makes it public action aid. The question is whether the
public standards or public aid are dependent on an evaluation of private re-
ligious belief.7 ' If not, then to apply judicial reckoning is to enter the domain
of religion forbidden under the first amendment.
The converse implications of this opinion can be suggested by a brief ex-
cursion into the Sunday Closing Law cases: McGowan v. Maryland,7" Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley,7" and Braunfield v. Brown.
74
These cases involved the constitutionality of statutes which made it mandatory
to close stores on Sunday. Since some Jews closed on Saturday in observance
of their religion, it was argued that such a regulation was unconstitutional,
because it penalized people for practicing their religion.
The Court did not find the laws unconsitutional-a result which may be
justified as the converse of Everson. Just as we cannot invalidate aid because
religious people may use it to benefit their religion, so we cannot invalidate
regulations solely because people may be affected adversely in their religion.
Since we cannot use the content of any particular religion to judge the
69. Id. at 47.
70. The appositeness of the analogy might also be questioned in light of Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
71. See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra.
72. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
73. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
74. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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application of a public standard, we cannot strike down Sunday-dosing legis-
lation because it affects Jews. 75
Two arguments can be made against this position. First, the statute is, in
fact, designed to hurt Jews and as such infringes free religious practice;
second, although the state has a right to declare that there should be a day
of rest, it can show no non-religious reason to pick Sunday. This latter
argument resembles those that Catholics have made about Pierce. A day of
rest is justified, but not Sunday, if picking Sunday is but a manifestation of
religious belief. The answer to the first argument is that malicious legislative
intent has to be shown conclusively. If it is shown that the exclusive function
and purpose of the law was to attack a particular religion then it is invalid-
but such an allegation has no specific support, and secular reasons for having
everybody closed the same day-for example, ease of enforcement--can be
advanced to support choice of that day when most citizens will choose to rest.
Again, it is impossible to separate this part of the regulation-the choice of
day-from the whole public purpose, and the state has the right to define
that one day which it thinks the stores should be closed. Many examples of
difficulties in allowing religious criteria to affect closing regulations can be
imagined. 76 If one were to judge the choice of a day by its religious effects,
this would be to do what the Ballard analysis showed to be a mistake-to
entertain descriptions and accounts of religion. Rather, since the statute de-
fines public action by regulating people in the operation of commerce, it does
not enter into the range of private religious expression and cannot be judged
by the fact that the goals of religion may coincide or clash with the actuality
of the legal regulations unless an attempt to create such a clash can be clearly
shovn.
These principles of interpretation of the first amendment's commands, de-
rived from Ballard, manifest in Everson and McGowan, and amplified by a
distinction evidenced in Barnette, can be summarized as follows: (1) The
function of the Constitution is to exclude calculation of religious values, be
they motives for deceit, or aid, or violation of statutes. (2) The Constitution
also prevents the formulating or examining of the possible private ways of
,acting on religious beliefs.
That these simple commands can be applied in other cases is demonstrated
by an excursion into the recent and controversial school prayer case, Engel v.
Vitale.7 Once again, Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. The
prayer which the state prescribed for morning recitation was as follows:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country."78 The schools,
75. The strength of this statement has been considerably weakened as law by Sherbert
v. Verner, 83 Sup. Ct. 1790 (1963). See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra.
76. Cf. Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943).
77. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
78. Id. at 422.
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unlike those in Barnette, did not compel any pupil to join in this affirmation
over his or his parents' objections.
Mr. Justice Black based his argument on two points. "There can be no
doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious
beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer. ' 79 The particular defect was that the
state promulgated religious doctrines in the schools. Clearly that falls under
the ban of state-established religions. Secondly; "When the power, prestige
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."' 0 Given the existence of
such compulsion towards belief, the case's similarity to Barnette becomes
evident. The state uses its machinery to make people act in such a way as to
affect their beliefs. To utilize schools for religious activities is to foster re-
ligion unconstitutionally."'
In short, the prayer is a religious formulation. Even to say that it is common
to all religions is to prescribe for future religions. The prayer utilizes state
machinery to foster a religion. Both are banned under the Constitution. The
prayer functions to permit the state to define religious affirmations. That
breaches the separation of the domains .
2
Two recent Supreme Court actions, however, cannot be reconciled with
the suggested approach to the problems of religion under the first amend-
ment; they illustrate the confusion sometimes resulting from tenderness to-
wards religious defenses. In Sherbert v. Verner,8 3 Mr. Justice Brennan,
79. Id. at 430. See also id. at 435.
80. Id. at 431.
81. Not only is the prayer religious, but it is clearly so. Imagine the furor if parochial
schools were compelled to start with that prayer; or Jewish Orthodox Sabbath Schools,
to use it before starting to teach Hebrew. The religious character of the ceremony was
implicitly conceded by the state when it permitted religious objectors to abstain. In dis-
cussing other school prayers, Justice Goldberg, referring to this case, asked whether "the
state cannot compose but can select?" 31 U.S.L. Wzmc 3276 (March 5, 1963).
82. Mr. Justice Douglas, in concurring, took off from the constitutional financing of
religious exercise to worry about all the uses of money involving state and religion. But
the question is whether the money and the statute related to its expenditure function to
give state aid to particular religious formulations of belief. Mr. Justice Stewart, on the
other hand, noted that "God Save the United States and this Honorable Court" precedes
the Court's session. If a similarity in nature of the ritual exists, we should strike down
the Court's ritual. But that issue has not arisen, and may be distinguishable on grounds
of vacuity. Mr. Justice Black's footnote 21 is relevant here. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 435 (1962). Mr. Justice Stewart also states that we, as a people, presuppose a Su-
preme Being though the Constitution does not say so. As legal argument such an invoca-
tion is very weak. It is a dictum from Zorach v. Clauson, sipra note 70, which in allow-
ing for released time from schools for religious services, affirmed as most important in
McCollum v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 203 (1947), the fact that the classrooms were used for
religious instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote that instruc-
tion. To use a dictum from a case which explicitly held that the use of classrooms for
fostering religious exercises was a crucial constitutional defect to try to uphold the school
prayer is almost weaker in law than constitutional analysis.
83. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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speaking for a majority which included Mr. Justice Black, concluded that
the "benefits" of state unemployment compensation could not be kept from
a Seventh Day Adventist, who could not get a job because she refused to
work on Saturday. He reasoned that the opposite decision would condition
the "availability of benefits upon ...willingness to violate a cardinal prin-
ciple of her religious faith."8 4 In Re Jennison,8 5 the Court hinted a willing-
ness to extend this reasoning by remanding, for reconsideration in the light
of Sherbert, the Minnesota Supreme Court's affirmance of a decision holding
a woman in contempt of court for refusing jury duty on claimed religious
grounds. 86 The woman claimed the refuge of biblical command--"Judge not
that ye shall not be judged"--in refusing her civic duty.8 7
To permit a religious defense in either of these cases is to adopt a view of
the first amendment very different from that presented here.88 This different
view finds in the Constitution and its amendments the suggestion of an ideal
society, and supports that finding with a conception of constitutional inter-
pretation designed to implement the discovered ideal in each fact situation.
This view interprets the first amendment command of religious freedom as an
instruction to decide each case so as to choose freedom for religious activities
to the maximum degree consistent with social order. The establishment clause
is interpreted as a complement to the command for freedom in that it pre-
vents any one religion from gaining ascendance to the detriment of others.
Religion is then an allowable defense to the operation of those rules which,
although neutral in the abstract, in practice infringe particular religious prac-
tices-Sunday closing laws, laws outlawing polygamy,89 rules enforcing jury
service, etc. And to foster the free exercise of religion, exemptions and bene-
fits may be bestowed-tax exemptions for religions, draft exemptions for
pious conscientious objectors, chaplains for the armed services. The role of
the decision maker is the practical one of examining factual situations with
the goal of structuring the legal order so as to reduce to the minimum its
conflict with particular religions. 90
84. Id. at 406.
85. 84 Sup. Ct. 63 (1963).
86. - Minn. -, 120 N.W2d 515 (1963).
87. Id. at 516.
88. This view was most ably suggested to me by Professor Alexander M. Bickel,
whose friendly criticism has been an aid in many respects.
89. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
90. The scope of the balancing process involved, and the inherent slipperiness of the
approach as a tool for sensitive inquiry, are suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1942). See
also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) where a young Jehovah's Witness was
held validly convicted for sale of magazines on, Boston streets, in violation of a city or-
dinance. Rather than, balancing religious interests with community interests, courts should
treat all citizens before them equally, once it is shown that the community interests in-
volved (here, protecting the health of minors) exist in the realm of public action. Of
course, any argument that the statute was, in fact, directed at these particular religious
distributions would also be treated independently of any considerations of balancing.
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As a principle of constitutional interpretation, this practical approach is
neither exclusive nor-at least to the author9 1-persuasive. In its particular
application to the problem of religions operating in society, it presents many
difficulties. Assessing or assisting particular religions-defining the concept
"religion"-not only tends to establish those religions but also seems to limit
the domain of future religions by requiring them to be similar to present ones
if they wish to claim similar defenses or benefits. The state should not define
religion and, therefore, cannot pass laws or entertain defenses that are directed
to the aid of particular religious establishments. The activities of religions
have their meaning in their effects on religious peoples' assents-we do not
want the state performing assessments in that domain. Further, the "practical
results" of this alternative approach are not uniformly beneficial. How does
the woman in Jennison differ from those pacifists who refuse to pay taxes to
support war? Or Vivian Kellems, whose tax reprisals are based on anti-wel-
fare sentiments? Are Jehovah's Witnesses or Catholics pleased that their
religions are thought by Draft Boards not to justify pacifism or conscientious
objection? -In the implementation of standards of exemption designed to aid
the practice of religions, many religious groups and many positions labeled
as religious may be excluded, to the detriment of their freedom of religion.
I find no constitutional compulsion to give conscientious objectors exemp-
tions, Mormons many wives, or churches freedom from taxes. More impor-
tant, these goals can and must be achieved in a way that removes the state
from the business of defining and enshrining religions. As the Second Circuit
has very recently recognized, 92 the exemption for conscientious objectors
cannot be made dependent upon belief in a Supreme Being. Unfortunately,
the Second Circuit failed to follow the logic of its position through, and
implied that the state could establish a definition of religion-so long as it
included non-deistic religions- and condition grant of the exemption upon
-belief in a "religion." The exemption should be made available on grounds
of moral belief in the wrongness of war, because we tolerate dissent on a
model of free society; but we are not compelled to make the exemption avail-
able because that dissent is labeled "religious." Activities in a religious group
might be one of the factors considered 'ifi granting such an exemption, but
only in the process of determining sincerity.93 On similar grounds of tolerance,
91. Weiss, Book Review, 72 YALE L.J. 1665 (1963).
92. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). See also United States v.
Jakobson, 325 F:2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), which found as religious a particular notion of
"horizontal" relation to God. Seeger explicitly recognizes the conceptual difficulty of in-
sisting upon a distinction between Jakobson's devotion to a mystical force of "Godness".
and Daniel Seeger's compulsion to follow the paths of "goodness," suggesting further the
efficacy of avoiding judicial analysis of religious content as a requirement for exemption.
93. A difficult problem for those who adopt the view that religious freedom just com-
mands toleration of religious practices is found in H.R. REP. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., tit. 7, § 704(b) (1964) (on unfair employment practices). It states: "It shall not
be unlawful employment for an employer to refuse to hire ... because of said person's
atheistic practices and beliefs." The couching of a refusal in apparently non-religious
terms might raise no difficulties for their views. I find five insurmountable constitu-
tional objections. (1) In general, there is a violation of equal protection. (2) To define
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it would be advisable to permit polygamy for those who recognize its moral
rectitude; yet there is no constitutional compulsion to do so. Persons who do
not wish to judge on juries, for whatever moral grounds, are probably unfit
for jury duty, and perhaps should be excused on that basis; but there is no
constitutional compulsion to accept an excuse based on a personal reading of
a religious document for failing to fulfill public duties in the realm of public
action. Religions with charitable aspects might be granted tax exemptions as
charities; but to discriminate between what is and is not "religious" as a basis
for denial or grant of government benefits should be forbidden. In short, if it
is true that freedom is benefited by giving exemptions to extreme groups when
they do nothing of serious harm to the commonwealth, the religious nature of
some of these groups should neither include or exclude them from the total
class. When we run across results of apparent injustices, we can correct them,
should we choose to, using notions of freedom for dissent, rather than defini-
tions, confusions, and establishments of religions.
In sum, religion calls for affirmations and is expressed in actions manifest-
ing those beliefs. It is protected by the first amendment when clearly repre-
sented as religious, but only in the realm of belief or pure manifestations
affecting belief. The state operates in many perspectives and can regulate the
public domain. Both the law's perspective and a particular religion's perspec-
tive may overlap in a particular fact situation. But the Constitution prevents
law from entering the purely private domain of religious expression and
belief. This implies that the state can neither tamper with nor examine re-
ligious affirmations nor prescribe religious perspectives. Moreover, the state
cannot predicate its statutes or their application on the nature of an affirma-
tion or its conjunction with a statute. Beyond the realm where the two are
conjointly prescriptive, the lawyers' and judges' job is to apply the public
standard and only that, once it is found that the statute's operation is not
predicated upon a distinction in affirmation or belief. These categories allow
us to develop a rationale for the most important of the Supreme Court's
decisions involving religion, and to discriminate the range of permissible
activities for purposes of future decisions. The task is to discern whether
religion forms a variable in the statute's formulation or application by seeing
whether an assumption or decision on a perspective of belief is called for. If
so, then the statute is unconstitutional. If not, then religion can form neither
a defense to its application nor a justification after application for calling the
statute unconstitutional.
atheism as something special denies any atheist the status of a participant in religion.
Confucianism causes trouble, as such a doctrine of interpretation would attempt a mis-
taken definition of religion. Cf. Seeger, supra note 92. (3) To enact a statute about
atheism on practice and belief and give it to someone to administer would lead to serious
troubles. For one thing, it is probably unconstitutionally vague. For another, to allow
government agents to decide about religion for qualification is to allow the state into
religious decisions unconstitutionally. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960). (4)
There is an unconstitutional test oath implicit here. (5) To reject atheism as encouraging
religion seems to be a law in its very terms "respecting the establishment of religion."
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